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BRIEF OF APPELLEE MARY ANN ROBERTS (SADLER)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant
to §78-2a-3(2)(i), U.C.A. (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Did the Trial Court Correctly Apply the

Provisions of §78-45-7.2(4)(5), U.C.A. (1953, as Amended) in
its Modification of the Child Support?

1

The applicable standard of appellate review requires
the Appellate Court to accord substantial deference to the
trial court's action and gives the trial court considerable
latitude in determining appropriate relief; the Appellate
Court will not disturb the trial court's actions unless the
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or there has
been an abuse of discretion.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d

393 (Utah 1985); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App.
1990); Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985).

2.

Does the Fact that the Record Submitted for

Appellate Review Failed to Include the Findings of Fact Made
and Entered by the Trial Court Constitute Reversible Error?
The applicable standard for review requires the trial
court to iricike and enter findings of fact which should be
provided in the record to the appellate court for review.
However, when the Findings of Fact are made and entered by
the trial court, but then are not included in the trial
court's record for appellate review the Standard of Review
does not require this omission to be held as reversible error
and the appellate court should look to the remaining record
to complete its review.

§30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as amended);

Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.

2

3.

Was There a Material Change of Circumstances

Sufficient to Modify the Decree of Divorce?
The Standard of Review applicable to this case where
the Appellate failed to provide a transcript of the
proceedings at which the trial court heard the evidence and
ruled upon the issue on appeal, the Appellate Court must
presume that the trial court's action and resulting order
were supported by the evidence and that a material change of
circumstance was demonstrated.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709

P.2d 393 (Utah 1985)

STATUTES AND RULES
Statutes
§78-45-7.2(2)(a)(b) U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (4-23-90)
(2)(a)

(b)

The child support guidelines shall be applied as
a rebuttable presumption in establishing or
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent
child support.
The rebuttable presumption mecins the provisions
and considerations required by the guidelines
and the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provision of
this section.

3

§78-45-7.2(4) (5) U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (4-23-90)
(4)(a)

(5)

Natural or adoptive children of either parent
who live in the home of that parent and are not
children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a
child support award, as provided in Subsection
(5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that
compute the obligations of the respective
parents for the additional children. The
obligations shall then be subtracted from the
appropriate parent's income before determining
the award in the instant case.
In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other
than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be
applied to justify a decrease in the award.
Rules

Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.
(a)

Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A;
in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of
4

the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The
trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in ruling on motions, except
as provided in Rule 412(b). The court shall,
however, issue a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one
ground.
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(2)

Transcript required of all evidence regarding
challenged finding or conclusion. If the
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall
include in the record a transcript of all
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The case on appeal is based upon an Order Modifying
Decree of Divorce which was entered on March 10, 1992, in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

A Petition for Modification filed on September 28,

1990, requested a change of custody on the part of Mr.
Roberts, the Plaintiff.

Mrs. Roberts, the Defendant,

counterclaimed requesting an increase in child support
payments pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
The issue concerning change of custody of the parties two (2)
minor children was settled upon receipt of the child custody
evaluation recommending that the two (2) minor children
5

remain with Mrs, Roberts*

A trial was held on the issue of

the Counterclaim requesting a modification of child support
and extended visitation rights.

Trial was held in two (2)

settings; the first, on January 9, 1992, and the second, on
January 21, 1992*

The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs.

Roberts to increase the child support payments and to clarify
the summer visitation schedule.

Mr. Roberts appealed the

decision of the trial court in regard to the child support
increase on the grounds that the trial court failed to
correctly apply the Uniform Child Support Guidelines by its
failure to take into consideration Mr. Roberts1 new child
from his subsequent marriage.

Mr. Roberts asserts that the

trial court did not have the option to not consider the new
child, but was obligated to deduct the expenses of the "child
not in common to both parties" in the application of the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

The other issues raised by

Mr. Roberts on appeal such as the existence of a material
change of circumstances and the entering of findings of facts
by the trial court are ancillary to that central issue on
appeal.

6

STATEMENT OP FACTS

1.

Mr. Roberts, the Plaintiff/Appellant, and Mrs.

Roberts, the Defendant/Appellee were divorced on March 5,
1984, (R.17).

Child support was set for the two (2) minor

children in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS
($175.00) per month, per child, for a total child support
obligation in the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS
($350.00).
2.

Subsequent to the divorce in 1984, Mr. Roberts

remarried and shortly before he brought his Petition for
Modification for Change of Custody on September 28, 1990, Mr.
Roberts and his new wife had a child born as issue of their
marriage.
3.

Mr. Roberts1 petition for modification of divorce

decree requested that there be a change of custody of the two
(2) minor children of his marriage with Mrs. Roberts. Mrs.
Roberts counterclaimed requesting an increase in child
support consistent with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
and asserting that in the interim period from the original
divorce on March 5, 1984, that there had been a material
change of circumstances in that the expenses of raising the
two (2) teenage boys had substantially increased on her
part, that the child support obligation of Mr. Roberts

7

had not changed since 1984 and that Mr, Roberts had
experienced a substantial increases in his income* (R.90)
4.

The trial court subsequently appointed a child

custody evaluator to prepare an evaluation.

The evaluation

submitted to the trial court recommended that the minor
children remain with Mrs. Roberts as the custodial parent
consistent with the original Divorce Decree of March 5, 1984.
5.

After a number of proceedings before the court on

discovery and scheduling, the matter came on for trial on
January 9, 1992, (R. 139) to resolve the remaining issues
between the parties, the primary issue being increased child
support.

Central to that issue was that of the question of

whether or not Mr. Roberts1 new child with his second
marriage was required to be factored into the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines by the trial court in determining the
child support.

This issue was heard on January 9, 1992, and

the court determined that it was not required to consider the
"child not in common to both parties" and that the child
support would be increased from ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE
DOLLARS ($175.00) per child, to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE DOLLARS
($212.00) per child.
6.

(T.160, 163).

The trial court continued the trial to January

21, 1992, at which time it heard the remainder of the
proffered evidence by the respective counsel and made

8

additional findings on visitation and again stated that the
child support would be increased from ($175.00) to ($212.00)
per month per child.

The trial court based its calculations

upon application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
(T.172)

The trial court made other additional findings in

regard to issues which have not been appealed.
7.

Mr. Roberts appealed the Order of Modification of

March 10, 1992, asserting that the trial court had no option,
but was required to take into consideration under the Uniform
Child Support Guidelines, the fact that Mr. Roberts had a new
child from a new marriage in determining the child support.
Secondarily, Mr. Roberts raised on appeal the fact that the
trial court had not made nor entered any Findings of Fact nor
was there a material change of circumstance* to justify the
increased child support.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Provisions

of §78-45-7.2, U.C.A. (1953, as Amended).

The position of

Mrs. Roberts, the Appellee, is that the trial court correctly
applied the provision of §78-45-7.2,(4)(5), which provide an
option to the trial court in considering the impact of a
"child not in common to both parties" in the calculation
of increased child support under the Uniform Child

9

Support Guidelines.

The position of Mr. Roberts, the

Appellant, is that the trial court has no option and is
required to consider his new child with his second marriage
after he optioned to take into account his new child for
consideration under the child support guidelines.

It is the

position of Mrs. Roberts that Mr. Roberts misreads §78-457.2(5), which in fact gives the trial court the option to
consider or not the new child and mitigate the increased
child support award.

The trial court chose not to consider

the "child not in common to both parties" in mitigating the
child support award.

Application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
are presumed to be correct unless Mr, Roberts can rebut the
presumption as is found in §78-45-7.2(2)(a)(b)• The record
does not reflect any rebutted presumptions nor any evidence
submitted by Mr. Roberts for which the trial court should
have rebutted the presumptions.

There is no abuse of

discretion in the trial court's decision not to mitigate the
child support increase by not considering the "child not in
common to both parties". Mr. Roberts failure to supply
rebuttable evidence is supported by the fact that Mr. Roberts
failed to provide a transcript for the hearing of January 9,
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1992, where the child support award was heard and determined
by the trial court.

Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure require that a transcript be provided to the
Appellate Court on all evidence which would challenge the
conclusions of the trial court. Although required, no such
transcript was provided.

II.

That the Record on Appeal Fails to Include the

Trial Court Findings of Fact is Not Reversible Error. Mrs.
Roberts acknowledges that findings of facts are required
under §30-3-5, U.C.A., (1953, as amended), and Rule 52(a)(c),
U.R.C.P.

A review of the record supplied for appeal fails to

include any designated findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

However, Findings of Fact were made by the trial court

on January 9, 1992, and supplemented on January 21, 1992, as
is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings, objections
to the findings by Mr. Roberts' attorney, and by the Order of
Modification entered by the trial court.

Furthermore, the

Order of Modification of March 10, 1992, is extensive in its
scope and breadth as to information, salary, and percentages
in the calculation of the increase of child support and the
application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines by the
trial court.

While not formally noted or designated as

findings of fact, Mrs. Roberts urges the Court that the Order
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of Modification of Decree of Divorce meets the threshold
requirements of findings of fact in view of the omission, not
explained by the Record, that the Record does not contain the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law submitted to
opposing counsel and to the trial court for entering which
the trial court acknowledges entering.

111.

The Trial Court Found a Material Change of

Circumstances Sufficient to Modify the Divorce Decree.

The

transcript of the proceedings the trial of January 21, 1992,
and the Order of Modification of March 5, 1992, reflect that
the Court was aware of the material change of circumstances
between the parties.

There was an eight (8) year span of

time from the original Divorce Decree of March 5, 1984, until
the Order of Modification of March 10, 1992. A significant
disparity existed between the income of Mr. Roberts and Mrs.
Roberts, and that the application of the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines showed a twenty one percent (21%) increase
in child support from 1992 to the original child support
payments rciquired in 1984. These factors cited above
constitute a material change of circumstances.

Taken

together with the fact that the trial court's order is
presumed to be correct in view of the fact that Mr. Roberts
failed to provide a transcript of the trial on January 9,
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1992, all establish the presumption that there was a material
change of circumstances and that the trial court's Order is
correct.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF §7845-7.2 U.C.A. (1953, AS AMENDED).

A.

Consideration by the Trial Court of "Children Not

in Common to the Parties11 is Optional in Determining Child
Support Amounts.

Mr. Roberts subsequent to the divorce from

Mrs. Roberts on March 5, 1984, remarried and shortly before
Mr. Roberts brought his Petition for Modification before the
Trial Court on September 28, 1990, he and his new wife gave
birth to a child.

Mr. Roberts urges this Court that the

trial court failed to correctly apply §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(5),
which reads as follows:
(4)(a)

(5)

"Natural or adoptive children of either
parent who live in the home of that parent
and are not children in common to both
parties may at the option of either party
be taken into account under the guidelines
in setting or modifying a child support
award, as provided in Subsection (5).
In a proceeding to modify an existing
award, consideration of natural or adoptive
children other than those in common to both
parties may be applied to mitigate an
13

increase in the award, but may not be
applied to justify an decrease in the
award." (Emphasis added).
While the trial court can consider "children not in
common to both parties" in a hearing to increase child
support payments, the trial court is not obligated to do so.
Consideration of "children not in common to both parties" is
optional with the trial court*

The trial court chose not to

take into consideration "children not in common to both
parties", but applied the Uniform Child Support Guidelines as
stated in its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce dated March
10, 1992, (Addendum "D", Page 5, Paragraph 4).

B.

Application by the Court of the Uniform Child

Support Guidelines are Presumed to be Correct.

§78-45-

7.2(2)(a)(b) sets forth this premise:
(2)

(a) "The child support guidelines shall be
applied as a rebuttable presumption in
establishing or modifying the amount of
temporary or permanent child support."
(b) The rebuttal presumption means the
provisions and consideration required by
the guidelines and the award amounts
resulting from the application of the
guidelines are presumed to be correct,
unless rebutted under the provisions of
this section."

14

Mr. Roberts failed to present any evidence that would rebut
the presumption of the application of the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines.

The record fails to reflect any evidence

submitted by Mr. Roberts to rebut the presumption applying
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

Therefore, the trial

court's application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines
should be upheld.

In failing to rebut the presumption for

the application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, Mr.
Roberts did not establish any special circumstances to rebut
the presumption that would justify deviation from the Uniform
Child Support Guidelines.

This Court has set out the

criteria for deviation from the application of the Uniform
Child Support Guidelines as rebuttable presumptions in the
case of Hill v. Hill, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 filed on November
4, 1992. The Court state on Page 27, the following:
"§78-45-7.2(2)(a) requires the trial court to
apply the child support guidelines as a
rebuttable presumption in estciblishing or
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent
child support. In order to rebut this statutory
presumption, the trial court must make a finding
that use of the guidelines would be unjust,
inappropriate or not in the best interest of the
child, Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.2 (3) (1992).
In this case, the trial court made no such
finding."
It is clear that the trial court did not make the finding
that the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in
the best interest of the minor children in the instant case.
15

(T.172), (Addendum "D", Page 5, Paragraph 4, Order Modifying
Decree of Divorce).

C.

Mr. Roberts Failed to Provide a Transcript of the

Hearing of January 9, 1992, Where the Child Support was Set.
The trial in the matter now before this Court on appeal was
held on two (2) separate settings.

The trial was originally

set and heard on January 29, 1992, with a second hearing date
held on January 21, 1992, (Please see Addendum "B", Minute
Entry, 01-09-92)*

At the trial on January 9, 1992, the trial

court established the child support amounts at TWO HUNDRED
TWELVE DOLLARS ($212.00) per month for a total of FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($424,00), (T.160, 162).
However, Mr« Roberts as the Plaintiff/Appellant in this
matter has provided this Court with a transcript only of the
proceedings of January 21, 1992, and not a transcript of the
proceedings of January 9, 1992, where the issue of child
support was heard and determined by the trial court.
1.

Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

requires that an Appellant who wishes to challenge a proposed
ruling of the trial court must prepare a transcript of that
portion of the evidence relevant to the finding or conclusion
that the Appellant wishes to appeal * Rule 11(e)(2), Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure states as follows:

16

Transcript required of all evidence regarding
challenged finding or conclusion. If the Appellant
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the Appellant shall include in the record a
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding
or conclusion.
Rule 11(e)(2) and its requirement for a transcript to be
supplied by the Appellant is supported by the Supreme Court
in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah
1985), on Page 394, where the Court states as follows:
"The Plaintiff has not provided this Court with a
transcript of any evidence produced at the hearing
below on his Petition for Modification. In the
absence of a transcript of the evidence below and
proper citations to the record which support a
substantial change of circumstance, we presume the
trial court's finding and order are supported by the
evidence. )Proudfit v. Proudfit. Utah, 598 P.2d 1318
(1979)."
Rule 11(e)(2) and Woodward v. Woodward, supra, support the
concept that the trial court is presumed to have correctly
applied the Uniform Child Support Guidelines in the instant
case. (T.172).

D.

Cases Cited by Mr. Roberts are Inappropriate.

Cases cited by Mr. Roberts requiring the trial court to
consider post-decree obligations are dated and no longer in
point.

§78-45-7.2 (4) (5) was rewritten and amended by the

Legislature with the effective date of April 23, 1990. Mr.

17

Robert's Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree was
filed with the trial court on September 28, 1990, (R.71).
Mr. Roberts cites three (3) cases which indicate that the
Court should take into consideration obligations of "children
not in common to both parties".

The Openshaw v. Openshaw,

639 P.2d 1771 (Utah 1981); Lord v. Shaw 682, P.2d 853 (Utah
1984); Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985).

None

of these cases are closely in point and do not deal with §7845-7.2(4)(5), as its amended on April 23, 1990. These cases
all predate even the first version of this statute prior to
its amendment by the Legislature on April 23, 1990. While
helpful in other contexts and for other purposes, these cases
should not be considered to be definitive in regard to the
application of the above cited statute.

There does not

appear to be any Utah appellate cases that apply to §78-457.2(4) (5) as amended (04-23-1990).

POINT II.

THAT THE RECORD ON APPEAL FAILS TO INCLUDE THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS SUPPORTING ITS ORDER OF
MODIFICATION IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.

18

A.

Defendant and Appellee Acknowledge that §30-

3-5 U.C.A., (1953, as amended) and Rule 52(a)(c), U.R.C.P.
Require that the Trial Court Enter Findings of Fact. Mrs.
Roberts acknowledges that findings of fact are required in
contested matters where a divorce decree is modified as in
the instant case. Mrs. Roberts believes that the trial court
complied with the requirement of §30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as
amended) and Rule 52(a)(c) U.R.C.P.

A review of the record

of the trial court and the transcript of the last of the two
(2) trial hearings clearly reflects that the trial court made
Findings of Fact, requested counsel to prepare the same and
then entered them.

B.

Findings of Fact Were Made by the Trial Court on

January 9, 1992, and January 21, 1992. At the first of the
two hearings at which the trial on this matter was held on
January 9, 1992, the trial court made modifications of the
child support.

On January 9, 1992, the trial court heard the

evidence and made findings of fact and rule>d that the child
support in the instant case would be TWO HUNDRED TWELVE
DOLLARS ($212.00) per month per child.

(T.2,4)

On January

21f 1992, at the second hearing the trial court reiterated
its conclusion of law on the child support issue and ruled on
the additional issues that yet remained between the parties.

19

(T.14,15)

However, as previously stated in Point I above, no

transcript has been provided by the Appellant for review of
those findings made on January 9, 1992.

C.

Findings of Fact were Prepared and Submitted by

Counsel Designed by the Trial Court.

The trial court on

January 21, 1992, after having made Findings of Fact for that
hearing and assigned counsel for Mrs. Roberts to prepare the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order
Modifying the Decree of Divorce to be submitted to the Court
on or before January 28, 1992, (T.15).

Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and an Order Modifying Divorce Decree
were submitted pursuant to the order of the trial court.
While the record for appeal does not include those Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the record does reflect Mr.
Roberts1 counsel receiving them, as he filed Objections to
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, on January 30, 1992. (R.143)
(Addendum "C")

It should be noted that the Objections filed

by Mr. Roberts1 counsel object not to the Findings of Fact as
submitted but only to specific paragraphs in the Order of
Modification.
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D.

Trial Court Acknowledges that it Entered its

Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial court

complied with the provisions of §30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as
amended) and Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., which require the entering
of Findings of Fact. While the record supplied for review
does not contain a copy of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law submitted to the court, the trial court
acknowledges entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in the first paragraph of the Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce entered by the Court on March 10, 1992. (R.146)
(Addendum

"D")

While the record on appeal makes no explanation why
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted and
entered by the Court are not included in the record for this
Court to review, it is clear that the trial court made
findings of fact and further requested that they be reduced
to writing and be submitted to the trial court for entering.
It is also clear that opposing counsel reviewed the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and filed objections to he
same.

And lastly, the trial court acknowledges entering the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prior to its entering
the Order of Modification.

There is no apparent explanation

why the Findings of Facts entered by the trial court are not
included with the trial record for review.
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However, this

failure of the record on appeal to include these findings is
not reversible erroro

Ee

(Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.)

The Order of Modification Entered by the Court

Includes Adequate Findings of Fact to Meet the Requirements
of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.

The scope of Mr. Roberts1 appeal to

this Court is narrow in its scope.

In its most condensed

form this appeal deals with the application of the Uniform
Child Support Guidelines by the trial court, and specifically
the application of §78-45-7.2(4)(5).

The trial court in its

Order Modifying Decree of Divorce of March 10, 1992,
Paragraph 4, Page 5, (R.150) (Addendum1^11), deals extensively
with the child support issue.

The trial court sets out the

income of each individual party, indicates that the court is
applying the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, and sets out
the child support obligation pursuant to those child support
guidelines,

The scope and breadth of the trial court's Order

of Modification goes well beyond the normal scope of a
conclusion of law and/or order.
It is the position of Mrs. Roberts that the Order of
Modification entered by the trial court contains the
essential elements necessary to constitute findings of fact
as well as the obvious conclusions of law of an order.

In

view of the unexplained absence in the record on appeal of
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the findings of fact entered by the trial court, this Court
should find that the requirement to provide findings of fact
are now met in the Order of Modification, as it contains
adequate findings of fact to meet the requirement of Rule
52(a) U.R.C.P.

POINT III
THERE WAS A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE.

A.

The Record Reflects a Material Change of

Circumstances.

Mr. and Mrs. Roberts were divorced on March

5, 1984. The child support was set for the two (2) minor
children at ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($175.00) per
child for a total monthly child support obligation of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($350.00).

The child support remained

the same for a period of eight (8) years until the Order of
Modification of March 10, 1992, was entered by the trial
court changing the child support to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE
DOLLARS ($212.00) per child for a total support obligation
for the two (2) teenage children in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($424.00) per month.

The

difference between support required by the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines applied by the Court and the previous
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child support obligation was SEVENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($74,00) a
month or a twenty one percent (21%) difference.

The trial

court set out in its Order of Modification the relative
salaries of each of the parties and showed the disparity
between the two,

(R.150) (Addendum "D")

The material circumstances reflected by the record
consist of the following:

((1) passage of time of eight (8)

years since an increase in child support has been granted;
(2) that the two boys were now teenagers? (3) the significant
disparity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant's income,
and (4) the application of the Guidelines as to the presumed
child support payments required, constituted a twenty one
percent (21%) increase from the original Divorce Decree child
support payments.

B.
be Present.

A Material Change of Circumstances is Presumed to
In view of the fact that the Plaintiff failed to

provide a transcript of the trial hearing on January 9, 1992,
at which time child support payments were argued and ruled
upon by the trial court, this Court must presume that the
findings of the court and its ultimate Order of Modification
are correct inasmuch as there is no record for this Court to
review.

(Please see Mrs. Robert's Argument in Point I,

Paragraph C , set out above).
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C«

Case Lav Cited in Support of Mr. Roberts1

Position is Not in Point.

Mr. Roberts cites Ostler v.

Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) as setting out the
standard of review to determine a material change of
circumstances.

In the case cited above, a material change of

circumstances was stipulated to by the parties and this Court
set out criteria for determining the appropriate child
support amount.

However, Ostler v. Ostler, supra, was

decided March 20, 1990, prior to the effective date of §7845-7.2 on April 23, 1990. The implementation of this statute
as currently amended presumes that the Uniform Child Support
Guidelines are appropriate unless that presumption is
rebutted.

There is no evidence submitted by Mr. Roberts that

indicates that the presumption of applying the Uniform Child
Support Guidelines was rebutted or that the trial court
established child support after considering the relevant
factors set out in Ostler v. Ostler, supra, or establishing
those specific elements needed to rebut the presumptions of
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines.

CONCLUSIONS

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
chose not to include "children not in common to both parties"
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in the application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines,
inasmuch as the inclusion of such children is optional with
the court.

While the record on appeal does not include

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were entered by
the trial court, the trial court did (1) make findings, (2)
ordered counsel to prepare written findings (3) counsel
submitted written findings to opposing counsel who objected
to them, (4) entered the findings and made reference to them
in its Order of Modificationo

In view of these facts, and

that the breadth and scope of the Order of Modification
included many of the findings of the Court, the requirements
of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. have been met and there is no
reversible error.

The record reflects that there was a

material change of circumstances from the date of the
original divorce and that child support had never been raised
or increased during the eight (8) year period, the two
children were teenagers, and that the Uniform Child Support
Guidelines set out the disparity between Plaintiffs and
Defendant's

income and called for child support that was

twenty one percent (21%) greater than the original Divorce
Decree eight (8) years previous.
Mrs. Roberts, as the Appellee, requests that the
Order of Modification of Decree of Divorce granted by the
trial court be affirmed.
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DATED this

^

day of March, 1993.

HOLLIS S. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
This is to certify that two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed to
attorney for Plaintiff/Appellate, Robert W. Hughes, 7050
Union Park Avenue #420, Midvale, Utah 84047, postage prepaid
this
HL> day of March, 1993 •

HOLLIS S. HUNT
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant
Mary Ann Roberts (Sadler)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS,
1

Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

-vsMARIANNE ROBERTS,

Civil No. D-83-4535

Defendant,

The above entitled matter having come on for hearing before
the Honorable David B. Dee, a Judge of the Third Judicial
District, on the 1st day of March, 1984; the plaintiff having
been present and represented by his attorney, JOSEPH C. FRATTO,
JR., and the defendant not being present or represented by her
attorney it appearing to the court that the defendant has
executed Entry of Appearance and Waiver; and the plaintiff having
testified to matters set forth in his Complaint, and the court
being fully advised in the premises, and having made and entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce

from defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty which Decree
shall become final and absolute upon entry.

n m *-f

2.

That defendant is awarded the care, custody and con-

trol of the minor children of the parties subject to plaintiff's
reasonbable and liberal rights of visitation.
3.

That defendant is awarded the sum of One Hundred Seventy

Five Dollars ($175.00) per month per child for a total of Three
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month as and for child
support and plaintiff allowed to claim both children for purposes of Federal and State income tax.
4.

That no alimony is awarded either party.

5o

That plaintiff is awarded the sum of Seven Thousand

Dollars ($7,000.00) from defendant from the sale of property
at 733 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, payable to plaintiff in the month following
said sale; and said amount is to be applied to debts and
obligations as hereinafter required if they have not been previously discharged by plaintiff and notice sent to defendant
by plaintiff informing her of their discharge.
6o

That plaintiff is required to maintain medical and

dental insurance which he receives from Salt Lake County for
the use and benefit of said minor children; and that all medical
and dental bills and expenses not covered by said insurance
should be divided equally between plaintiff and defendant and
each required to discharge one half (^) thereof.
7.

That plaintiff is awarded the 1979 Ford Bronco and

defendant is awarded the 1981 Ford Mustang automobile.
8,

That all property including furniture, furnishings,

AA1
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fixtures/ appliances and personal effects is awarded to that
party in possession and as previously agreed.
9.

That each party is awarded their interest in their

retirement account and the other party shall take nothing
thereby.
10.

That plaintiff is required to discharge the following

debts and obligations and to hold defendant harmless from the
same.

11.

a.

ZCMI $300.00

b.

Utah State Credit Union $3,500.00

c.

Sears $200.00

d.

VISA $500.00

e.

MasterCharge $900.00

f.

Firestone Tires $50.00

That defendant is required to discharge the obligation

with Merchandise World of $600.00 and hold plaintiff harmless
from the same.
12.

That each party is required to pay their own attorneys

fees and costs incurred in this matter.
DATED this

/£>

day of

' ^ ^ A A ^ S ^ ^

BY THE COURT:

D7WID B. DEE, Judge
r

D^Mtv C*erk

, 1984.

MAILED a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to Marianne
Roberts, 67 27 South 100 East, Midvale, Utah, 84047.
This

C<?

day of

'^(AxjuJi

, 1984.

r\ f\ r* r\
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
ROBERTS NICHOLAS JOHN
PLAINTIFF
VS
ROBERTS MARY ANN

CASE NUMBER 834904535 DA
DATE 01/09/92
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG
COURT CLERK AAB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
NON JURY TRIAL
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. HUGHES, ROBERT W
D. ATTY. HUNT, HOLLIS S

THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE
MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE, APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE.
AFTER HEARING ARGUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS THAT
THE ABOVE MATTER BE CONTINUED TO JANUARY 21, 1992 AT 11:00 A.M.
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0H;

$
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4 usrH'^
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ROBERT W. HUGHES #1573
Attorney for Plaintiff
7050 So. Union Park Avenue
Suite 420
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3688

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON PETITION TO
MODIFY AND ON ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF
DIVORCE

MARY ANN ROBERTS (SALDER),
Defendant.

Civil No. D83-4535
Judge Pat Brian

The Plaintiff, Nicholas John Roberts, by and through
his counsel of record, hereby objects to the Order Modifying
Decree of Divorce submitted to this Court by Defendant's counsel
for the following reasons:
1.

Plaintiff believes that Paragraph 3(c) does not

accurately represent the ruling of this Court.

Plaintiff

objects to that part of Paragraph 3(c) which provides as
follows:
The Defendant shall have the priority in
the choosing of her three weeks continuous
summer visitation over that of the
Plaintiff.
Defendant must notify the
Plaintiff by 5:00 p.m. March 10, 1992 of
the three weeks period of continuous
visitation that she selects.
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Plaintiff has requested a copy of the transcript of the Court's
ruling to verify that this is a ruling of this Court.
2.

Plaintiff

proposed Order.

objects

to

Paragraph

3(d) of the

Plaintiff objects to this paragraph on the

grounds that its does not incorporate all of the holidays upon
which visitation should be alternated between the parties.
Specifically, the Order does not include Martin Luther King
(Civil Rights Day). Martin Luther King Day is a holiday listed
on this Court's schedule of reasonable visitation and should be
included in the Order.
3.

The Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3(f) of the

proposed Order. Paragraph 3(f) provides that the Plaintiff and
Defendant shall alternate Christmas vacation on Christmas Eve
and Christmas Day but does not provide that the Defendant should
also have visitation with the parties' minor child continuing
through one-half of the child's total Christmas school vacation
as provided by the schedule of reasonable visitation prepared by
this Court.
4.

The Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3(i) of the

proposed Order.

The Court gave no specific ruling with regard

to grandparent visitation nor was grandparent visitation an
issue raised by either parties in their initial pleadings.
Plaintiff objects to the inclusion of grandparent visitation
| unless such provision provides that neither party shall initiate
contact with the parent of the other.
5.
Order.

Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 of the proposed

Plaintiff's objection is based upon the fact that the
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parties stipulated that child support should be reduced by fifty
percent

(50%) for each

child

for time periods where

the

Plaintiff has extended visitation with the children for at least
25 of any 30 consecutive days pursuant to the provisions of 7845-7,11 of the Utah Code,
DATED this

^T^

day of January, 1992.

ROBERT W. HUGHES

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Objection to Hollis S. Hunt, Attorney for Defendant, 243 East
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage
prepaid, this *£/

day of January, 1992.

dL-^'^^i

£**?£>
*' (j

roberobe.obj
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FILED DISTRICT C0UIT
Third Judicial District

<A
HOLLIS S. HUNT - #1587
Attorney for Defendant
'""
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0099

MAR 1 0 1992
Of**fC**

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS,
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No, D83-4535
MARY ANN ROBERTS (SADLER),
Judge Pat Brian
Defendant.
The Hearing of the Defendant upon her Counterclaim
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Pat B.
Brian on January 21, 1992• The Plaintiff was present and
represented by and through his counsel, Robert W. Hughes.
The Defendant was present and represented by and through her
attorney, Hollis S. Hunt. The Court having heard the
testimony of the parties and respective counsel, reviewed the
exhibits therein, and after having been fully advised in the
premises, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE OF MARCH 6, 1984.
The Divorce Decree of March 6, 1984, between the parties and
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any subsequent hearings and Orders are hereby modified as set
out belowe
2.

CHILD CUSTODY.

The care, custody and control of

the minor children:
NAME

DATE OF BIRTH

Nicholas John Roberts, III

November 21, 1978

Michael Kay Roberts

November 2 2 , 1982

shall continue to remain with the Defendant, mother, who
shall have full and sole custody of the minor children,
subject to reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff
which are more particularly set out below.
3.

VISITATION,,

The following shall constitute a

visitation schedule between the Plaintiff and the Defendant
for the two (2) minor children referred to above in Paragraph
1.

This visitation schedule shall govern visitation between

the Plaintiff and the Defendant and shall be considered to be
the minimal visitation scheduled provided,,

The minimum

visitation schedule for the parties is as follows:
(a)

Weekend Visitation,

The Plaintiff shall be

entitled to visitation with the minor children
every other weekend from Friday at 7:00 p.m.,
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.
(b)

Alternate Weekdays.

On the weeks that the

Plaintiff does not have weekend visitation, the
Plaintiff shall be entitled to an afternoon with
the children based upon a twenty-four (24) hour
notice to the Defendant.

The visitation on the

alternate week-day afternoon shall be from 3:30
p.m. until 8:00 p.m. that evening.
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Summer Visitation. The Plaintiff shall be
entitled to a continuous period of visitation
during the summer months with the minor children
for a period of four (4) weeks. Defendant shall
be entitled to a continuous period of visitation
with the minor children for a period of three
(3) weeks. During the continuous period of
visitation by both the Plaintiff and the
Defendant none of the weekend visitation,
alternate weekdays, or holiday visitation shall
be in force or effect. Such holidays as are
missed by either the Plaintiff or the Defendant
shall be moved to the next scheduled holiday for
which the Summer visitation does not interfere.
The Defendant shall have priority in the
choosing of her three (3) weeks continuous
summer visitation over that of the Plaintiff.
Defendant must notify the Plaintiff by 5:00
p.m., March 10, 1992, of the three (3) week
period of continuous visitation that she
selects.
Holidays. Plaintiff and Defendant shall
alternate standard holiday visitation with the
minor children of the parties and shall continue
with the current rotation schedule that is now
in existence between the parties. Standard
holidays are as follows:
New Years Day
Martin Luther King
President's Day
Easter
Memorial Day
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July 4th
July 24th
Labor Day
(e)

Thanksgiving,

The parties shall alternate

Thanksgiving with the one party having the
children until 2:00 p.m., on Thanksgiving, with
the other party having the children from 2:00
p.m. until 8:00 p.m., on Thanksgiving Day, the
parties alternating every other year.

The

rotation schedule shall remain the same as is
currently being utilized by the parties.
(f)

Christmas Vacation.

The non-custodial parent

shall have visitation beginning on Christmas Day
at 1:00 p.m., and continuing through the
remainder of one half (1/2) of the childrens
total Christmas School Vacation.
(g)

Mother 1 s/Father f s Day.

Each of the respective

parties shall be entitled to Mother f s Day and
Father's Day irrespective of the visitation
schedule of the parties.

These two (2) days

shall take precedence over other visitation and
the individual parties shall be entitled to have
visitation with the children on that day from
8:00 a.m. to 8: p.m.
(h)

Birthdays.

The Plaintiff and the Defendant

shall both have access to the children on the
birthdays of the respective child to be worked
out between the Plaintiff and Defendant so not
as to interfere with the children's celebration
of their birthday.
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4.

CHILD SUPPORT.

The Plaintiff shall each have a

child support obligation as is set out herein.

The Plaintiff

at the present time is earning a monthly gross salary of
($2,376.00) per month.

The Defendant is earning a gross

monthly salary of ($1,478.00) per month.

Pursuant to the

Uniform Support Guidelines the Plaintiff is required to pay
sixty-two percent (62%) of the child support obligation for
the sum of $212.00 per month for each minor child for a total
payment of ($424.00) per month.

The Defendant is required to

provide thirty-eight percent (38%) of the child support
obligation equal to the sum of ($259.00) per month.

The

total child support obligation owed by the Plaintiff to the
Defendant is the sum of ($424.00) per month.

The child

support shall be paid until each minor child has reached the
age of eighteen (18) and graduated from high school.
(a)

Non-Payment.

In the event of non-payment the

Plaintiff shall be subject to income withholding
pursuant to §62A-401, U.C.A. to insure the
collection of child support stated herein.

The

parties acknowledge that the child support
obligations as are stated herein are pursuant to
Child Support Guidelines, and they further
affirm and swear that the amounts stated herein
are pursuant to those guidelines, and that the
income stated herein is supported by pay stubs
or other information which correctly reflects
both parties income.
(b)

Extended Visitation.

Child support of the non-

custodial parent during periods of extended
visitation with the non-custodial parent shall
be reduced pursuant to §78-45-7.11, U.C.A.
(1953, as amended).

5
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5o RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT. The increase in child
support from ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($175.00) per
child to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE DOLLARS ($212.00) per child, set
out above in Paragraph 3 shall be retroactive to October 18,
1990, the date of the filing of the Defendant's counterclaim
to the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree.
The increase in child support from the past ordered child
support to the currently ordered child support is the sum of
SEVENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($74.00) per month for sixteen (16)
months. The sum of the retroactive child support for which
the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant is the sum
of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR DOLLARS ($1,184.00),
which shall be paid at the rate of FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) per
month starting on February 1, 1992, and the first day of the
month thereafter until paid in full.
6o INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS. The Defendant shall be
entitled to claim the income tax deductions for the two (2)
minor children for both Federal and State Income taxes
pursuant to the policy of the Uniform Child Support
Guidelines. The Plaintiff shall not be entitled to claim the
two (2) minor children as income tax deductions.
7* ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. Both parties shall be
required to pay their respective attorney's fees, and costs
with the Plaintiff paying the costs of the Child Custody
Evaluation.
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8.

The parties, as provided by Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10.3,

shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and
welfare of the children, and, where possible, confer before making
decisions concerning any of these areas.

The Defendant shall

provide to the Plaintiff notice of the childrens' school, extracurricular, and sporting activities, including, but not limited to,
the dates and times of parent-teacher conferences, copiers of the
childrens' school report cards, notice of any scouting or other
extra-curricular

activities,

and

the

schedule

of

sporting

activities in which the children may participate.
DATED this

/ 0

day of March, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

PAT B. BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to form

ROBERT W. HUGHE^
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ORIGINAL
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No, S34904535DA
Honorable Pat B. Brian

MARY ANN ROEERTS,

HEARING

Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
January 21, 1992

RHP W»Tfi»S? CPmi
BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER Thnd Judical District

JUL 2 2 1992
SAL1 LAK£ UUUK i 1

By.

Deputy Cteffc

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
Roberts, D83-4535.

Nicholas John Roberts vs. Mary Ann
Counsel will state an appearance,

MR. HUGHES:

Robert Hughes for Nicholas Roberts, the

plaintiff.
MR. HUNT:
THE COURT:
MR. HUNT:

Hollis Hunt for the defendant.
You may proceed,,
Your Honor, we are here based upon our

past appearance before this Court on January 9, 1992.
Court —

there are five issues.

The

The Court gave its thinking

on these issues, and then sent counsel out to see if we could
resolve them.

Let me review those issues for you.

The Court indicated to us that -- let me back up, so
that you won't have to reread the file.

This matter was

brought by the plaintiff on a petition to modify.

The

defendant filed a counterclaim for increased child support,
some attorney's fees and some visitation rights.

The child --

the change of custody has been resolved in favor of the
defendant mother, with whom the children have been residing
the entire time since their divorce.
an issue.

That no longer remains

What does remain an issue is the counterclaim

raised by the defendant, asking for an increase of child
support.

The Court ruled last on January 9, 1992, that the

child support should be $212 per month, per child, for a total
of $424 for two teenage boys.

2

1

The question then became, that we could not resolve

2

between counsel, is whether or not, under the guidelines, that

3

the income tax deductions which had previously been claimed by

4

the plaintiff should now revert to the mother defendant, based

5

upon the fact that the guidelines are calculated based upon

6

the fact that the guidelines utilize the custodial parent

7

having the income tax deductions.

8

premise that the child support was calculated pursuant to the

9

guidelines, and, of course, the defendants posture.

And it was based upon that

10

Plaintiff refused to go along that line, wanting to split

11

those between the parties.

12

the intent of the Court, nor, certainly, not the guidelines.

13

But we did not believe that was

The other thing we would ask for was three

14

continuous weeks for the mother during the summertime.

15

not sure whether counsel for the plaintiff acknowledges that,

16

or not.

17

asking for three continuous weeks.

18

that -- excuse me, he has four weeks, and we have three.

19

insists that his four weeks visitation be continuous, without

20

any interruption.

21

a priority

Ke was going to talk to his client.

to d e t e r m i n e w h e n t h o s e

24 |

on t h a t .

We are just

He has six.

We want
Ke

All we have asked for is three, and we have

!2 I s u r e h o w s e r i o u s a n issue
agreement

I am

that

is.

Mr. Hughes and

three w e e k s a r e .
I couldn^t get

I am

not

an

I talked.

We also asked, on behalf of the defendant, for some
attorney's fees.

The Court was not heavily inclined to grant

those when we met on the 9th.
you my concern.

I am concerned.

Let me tell

It is that the defendant has been brought

into this court on November 28, 1990, on an order to show
cause, was previously brought in this court by the plaintiff
on January 2, 1991, again on March 13, 1991, October 17, 1991,
January 9, 1992, and again we are here on January 21, 1992.
She has $2,085 in attorney's fees.
matter —

We believe that the

the Court has given ample opportunity for the

parties to resolve the issue.

They just simply cannot.

We

would hope that the Court would make a definitive order today.
We clearly believe that we ought to have that done, and be
done with it today.
The only thing I would add to the Court is there was
some concern on the part of the plaintiff, because of a second
marriage and another child, and they want an offset for a
second child.

And the Court, I think, handled that matter on

the 9th, under 78-45-7.2, paragraph (4)(a), where it says that
they may be able to take that deduction.

In view of the fact

that the defendant makes such a small amount of income, and
that she has two boys, the Court concluded that the child
support would be $212 per child, for a total of $424.

We

would like a definitive ruling at this point, if we may.
THE COURT:
MR. HUGHES:

Response?
Brief response.

issues that are before the Court today.

These are the five
I agree with

4

1

Mr. Hunt.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. HUGHES:

What five issues arc before the Court?
The child support, the income tax

4

deductions, the three weeks -- continuous weeks of vacation,

5

and the attorney's fees.

6

that I wrote down.

7

MR. HUNT:

8

on.

9

issuec

You said five.

Those were the four

The child support, you have already ruled

There really are just -- the arrearage is the other
That is that defendant raised this issue on child

10

support on October 18, 1990, and that 16 months have

11

transpired.

12

month to the current child support of $424 a month, that f s $74

13

difference, if you times that by 16, if my calculation is

14

correct, it is $1,184.

15

that it was inclined to require the plaintiff to pay that

16

arrearage at $50 a month, or some nominal fee.

17

problem with that.

18

the statute that we are entitled to the arrearage, as we

19

raised this issue back in October of 1990.

20

issue,

21

There is a difference in child support of $350 a

The Court indicated last on the 9th

We have no

But we have asked for and believe under

MR. HUGHES:

That's the other

Those would be the five, your Honor.

22

If I may address each of those, I guess almost reverse order.

23

Counsel and I have talked about this.

24

diligently to work many of these matters out.

25

close, it has just been to the point where we haven ! t been

We have tried
While we are

able to come to a final conclusion.
Counsel has started out by citing for the Court, and
did so in the last hearing -- unfortunately, I was without a
statute, my statute book, on the last hearing —
that, if I may, in its entirety.

let me read

"The natural or adoptive

children of either parent who live in the home of that parent
and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the
guidelines."

This is not an option of the Court.

an option of us to agree on.

It is not

It is an option of either party.

As the Court will remember we did support a
memorandum, and in our memorandum we did indicate in that that
we had elected to include the work sheet indicating the
present children in Mr. Roberts1 home.
important for a couple of reasons.

We believe that was

The Court was -- the Court

pointed out, and applauded my client for paying $350 since
1984, but, as the Court pointed out $75, approximately,
increase in 1984 is not that much.
My client is a sheriff deputy.

It is a relative thing.

The Court is aware of his

income„
As the Court pointed out, the two children that we
are talking about today are older.
teenager.

One is, in fact, a

The Court pointed out it is very expensive to raise

a teenager.

All my client would like to point out on that

area, it is an election he could make, it is an election he

6

1

made, it is an election we have used to fill out the child

2

support work sheets, indicating he should pay $350 a month.

3

think that's important.

4

costs associated in raising a new child, especially, as the

5

Court pointed out, teenage children are very expensive to

6

raise, but an infant is also very expensive.

7

And the purpose for that is there are

In this case both my client and his new wife work,

8

Since they are both employed, they require day care.

9

child, as an infant, requires constant care.

10

expensive.

11

the child support work sheets.

12

I

That

That's very

That's our insistence in making that election on

Next, with regard to the income tax deductions, I

13

have argued this.

I will be very brief.

My client, as

14

pointed out, has been paying $350 since, I think, 1984,

15

probably higher than was required in 1984, and I think part of

16

that election was because he had, in fact, agreed to pay a

17

fairly high amount of child support for 1984 standards0

18

Suddenly now, it is about evened out, and they want to take

19

that away from him, even though he has had a long history of

20

paying that amount.

21

Court where he has been delinquent.

22

what happened.

23

that the child support guidelines now provide that the

24

custodial parent take them.

25

of story, a little different fact situation.

There has never been an issue before the
It is a matter of that's

That's what they agreed on.

We acknowledged

This is a little different type
We have

suggested, at the very least, if they are going to be taken
from my client, that that tax deduction be split.
Mr. Hunt has indicated that we have considered three
continuous weeks of visitation.

We have no problem with that.

We have agreed to it in principle.

The problem I have had,

and I have explained it to Mr. Hunt, is all we have asked is
either -- because she is the custodial parent, she has the
children that are there or in her custody all the time, that
either we make up the weekend that we miss, or add another
week, or some other arrangement.
Our reason for that is -- and I will try to give a
brief example —

for instance, if his visitation was on the

first weekend of a month, the second weekend he would have no
visitation, the third or the seventh, the fourteenth, if she
elected, he would not have visitation, the next week he would
not, the next week he would not, and the natural rotation of
things, he would not have visitation the next week, weekend
visitation, to be accurate, and he would have visitation the
next week.

That would mean my client would go between

visitations five or six weeks without visitation.

We simply

said that should be made up.
What we have are two good parents.

My client has an

interest of having a good relationship with his children.
Mr. Hunt has pointed out to me there is during the week
visitation, so it really wouldn't be that long.

All we have

8

been asking is that during that three-week period she can take
them, do whatever she wants, but let us make it up somehow.
Mr. Hunt has brought up the issue of giving
preference.

We have agreed, again in principle, to give them

the preference to decide what three weeks she wants.

However,

we have asked that, in making that election, that she make the
election by January 15.

The reason for that is my clientfs

new wife has to bid her vacations, and her bids are due during
that time.

So, for her to make a bid, so they can make a bid

for her visitation, and so they can arrange it, they need to
know approximately that time, at least have that much notice.
If she can elect by that, we have no problem with it.
The attorney's fees, we have argued this, your
Honor.

I have been here each of those times.

to act reasonably.
show cause.

We have tried

Mr. Hunt pointed out there was an order to

The Court is aware of the report by Dr. Landau,

of why we felt that it was important for us to come into court
immediately.

We have tried to be fair in this.

In fact, when

the Court said have a visit, a child custody evaluation done,
we did it.

My client paid for all of that.

came back.

My client had comfort or peace of mind that

everything was, in fact, all right.

The evaluation

And we dropped that.

So

the issue since that time has been trying to determine the
amount of child support.
The last issue would concern the amount of making

9

the —

if the Court orders that the child support should

increase, which we do not concede would be appropriate, under
the reading of 78-45-7.2(4), which I indicated to the Court,
that that should not be retroactive.
good parent.

My client has been a

Ke has tried to take care of his children.

If

the Court does order it, he will, of course, start making that
child support as ordered by the Court.

But it would not be

fair, under the circumstances of this case, considering the
income of my client, to suddenly make him start paying for
back child support, when he, as the Court indicated in our
last hearing, has been very fair and good about paying his
child support.
MR. HUNT:

Just a couple of comments, so there is

not a misconception about what the statute says.

If we read

78-45-7.2(5), which follows (4), which has been read to the
Court, it says, "In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children, other than
those common to both parties, may again be applied to mitigate
an increase in an award.11

That's talking about the Court.

It

is true that either party may elect to try to put that into
the calculation of the support amount.

But the Court still

has that election whether to accept it, or not.
The other concern that I have is that, somehow, the
plaintiff and Mr. Hughes haven't acknowledged the visitation.
All we are asking for is three weeks, so that the defendant

10

1

can take the children on a vacation.

In the past, the

2

plaintiff has insisted that his period of visitation during

3

the summer have absolutely no interruption.

4

about that.

5

can go on a vacation.

6

alternate weekend visitation, and on the weekend that he does

7

not have visitation, he has mid-week visitation.

8

been not a problem with that.

9

Somehow —

We haven f t argued

We just want reciprocity, so that the defendant
The plaintiff, at the present time, has

There has

and I haven't understood their

10

calculation or their theory -- they believe that if the

11

defendant were to have the children continuously for three

12

weeks, they would go some extended, five-week period of time

13

without visitation.

14

that happens, because they have visitation each and every

15

week,

16

next week it is mid week.

17

denial of visitation.

18

me, the defendant would have to make up that time.

19

certainly hasn f t been the position of the plaintiff to allow

20

her to make up that kind of time.

21

there, I think they are missing part of that visitation

22

schedule that we have put out,

23

It is impossible for me to understand how

It just so happens that one week it is weekend, and the
And there is just simply not a

I don't see how the plaintiff -- excuse
It

Somehow, the rationale

The other thing is that my client has asked for that

24

election of that three-week period, contrary to the

25

plaintiff's new wife, the party to this action, the defendant,

11

is not able even to select her visitation -- excuse me, her
vacation period at the Department of Corporations until March.
So it is just impossible for her to make an election in
January.

She has no problem complying with the January date

out of principle.

But that her department is run by the

State, and the State simply does not allow her to make an
election.

We will stipulate that she will make the earliest

possible election of her vacation time, that her employer
allows.

I don't want to penalize the plaintiff at all.

She

just simply doesnft have any control over the personnel policy
of the Department of Corporations.

Again, she thinks that the

earliest she can even make an election is March of each year.
If the policy at the Department of Corporations changes, she
will so notify the plaintiff, and make that election as soon
as her employer will allow her to do so.
Again, on the attorney's fees issue, we just believe
this thing has gone on and on.
oar.

We have handled the laboring

I have put out three different modifications -- proposed

orders and stipulations for the parties.
get the plaintiff to concede on this.
the issue on deductions.

We just can't simply

Ke continues to press

And it is clear that if we go by the

guidelines, the guidelines intricately are calculated upon
income tax deduction going to the custodial parent.

At $453 a

month, to raise two boys on $424 a month child support, she
simply has to have the deductions.

That is a matter of

12

settled law,

I don't even think it is arguable.

that that has been resolved long ago.

We believe

And the Court should

follow the settled law in this jurisdiction, based upon those
guidelines.

In other words, if the guidelines govern one

other aspect of the child support calculation, it ought to
govern the other aspect of it, as well, or otherwise it
doesn't have any efficacy.
We would submit it.
MR. HUGHES:

May I bring up one other quick issue

that I forgot to raise?

That, simply, deals with -- I don't

know it is a problem -- 78-45-7.11, reduction of child support
during the period that my client has extended visitation with
the children, since that's a part of the statute, part of the
guidelines, it is not a part of this decree, we would ask any
order the Court would make would include that prescription by
the statute,
MR, HUNT:

As long as it applies evenly across the

board, we will follow the guidelines,

I don't want to have

be stuck with the guidelines on one part of it, and then
ignore the income tax deduction on the other,

Obviously, we

will follow it.
THE COURT:
MR. HUGHES:

Both sides submit?
Yes, your Honor,

THE COURT:

The Court has met repeatedly with both

parties and counsel.

The Court has heard extensive argument

13

—

on the issues now before the Court.
rules as follows:

The Court is informed and

Regarding the change of custody, that

matter has been resolved previously, and will be reflected in
the findings, conclusions and the order of modification that
custody remains with the defendant.
Regarding child support, the Court finds that,
pursuant to the uniform child support guidelines, child
support is to be calculated at $212 per child per month.

That

is the order of the Court.
The counterclaim in this matter was filed in October
of 1990, increasing child support.

The increased child

support will relate back to the date of the counterclaim.

The

arrearages, unless they are disputed, in the amount of $1,184,
will be paid by plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of
$50 per month, the first payment is due February 1, 1992, and
$50 on the first day of each month thereafter, until the
arrearages in the amount of $1,184 have been paid in their
entirety.
By statute, the tax deductions belong to the
defendant.

The Court so orders.

The defendant, being the

custodial parent.
Regarding summer visitation, the plaintiff will have
four weeks of uninterrupted visitation to use as he
chooses.

The parties have stipulated that for that period of

time child support will be modified, accordingly, pursuant to

14

statute, ana that is the order of the Court.

The defendant

will have three weeks of uninterrupted summer vacation with
the children.

The defendant will notify the plaintiff on or

before 5:00 p.m. March 10, 1992, of the three weeks which will
be exercised for uninterrupted visitation by the defendant.
The Court has expressed its displeasure, on prior
occasions, with the parties1 inability to resolve what appear
to be very noncontroversial, nondisputed issues.

The failure

of the parties to do so has resulted in the incuring of very,
very substantial legal fees and court costs in this matter.
It is unfortunate that the fees have been incurred.

The Court

is not prepared to rule that one party is more at fault than
the other party in their combined inability to resolve these
issues.

Attorney*s fees will be borne by each party.
Counsel for the defendant will prepare findings of

fact, conclusions of lav; and a modified order, all reflecting
the stipulations of the parties and the rulings and findings
and conclusions of the Court.

Those documents will be

submitted for signature on or before January 28, 1992, at
5:00 p.m., for signing and filing with the clerk of the court.
(This proceeding was concluded.)
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